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Chapter Seven
Laborers or Criminals?
The Impact of Crimmigration on 
Labor Standards Enforcement
Kati L. Griffith
Soon after Alabama passed its crimmigration law in the Spring of 2011, an 
undocumented immigrant worker named Hortensia felt its impact. When 
she was not paid for her landscaping work, she attributed her employer’s 
behavior to Alabama’s crimmigration law. As she stated, the law “gives 
him the power ... You’re listening on the TV and the radio, knowing how 
little we can defend ourselves as immigrants now.... [Tjhere is no one to 
defend me.” She reported that it was not worth making a complaint about 
the failure to receive wages for the work she had performed. As she put it, 
“You can’t fight with anyone if you aren’t legal, and that’s why he didn’t pay 
us.... We haven’t gone to the court because it’s like we have no case because 
we’re illegal. We’re afraid to do it.” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012,
pp. 11-12)
As we examine the criminalization of immigration, commonly referred to 
as “crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2006), it is essential to consider its impact on 
other areas of law and policy that involve immigrants but are not traditionally 
thought of as formal elements of either criminal law or immigration law. Why? 
As Hortensia’s story illustrates, crimmigration may unexpectedly affect pro­
tections and rights that relate to immigrants’ experiences but come from other 
areas of law and policy. This chapter explores the impact of crimmigration on 
labor standards enforcement. By labor standards enforcement, the chapter 
refers mainly to the wage and hour, health and safety, anti-employment dis­
crimination, and collective activity protections that emerge when an employee 
performs labor for an employer. At the federal level, the statutes that provide 
these rights include the National Labor Relations Act (1935), the Fair Labor Stan­
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dards Act (1938), the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Occupation Safety and Health 
Act (1970) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act 
(1983). Most of these federal protections have state counterparts that provide 
equal or greater protections. Thus, labor standards protections generally come 
from the labor and employment law regime and arise because of the existence 
of an employment relationship, regardless of immigration status. As this chap­
ter will illustrate, the crimmigration dynamic threatens to negatively affect 
these longstanding and baseline workplace protections in a number of ways.
While crimmigration threatens the labor standards of immigrants and non­
immigrants alike, the crimmigration threat is felt most acutely by those immigrant 
workers who labor in the United States without sufficient immigration au­
thorization to do so (“undocumented workers”). Thus, the chapter will focus 
on crimmigration as it affects the significant number of undocumented work­
ers in the United States. Hortensia is not alone. A recent study by the Pew His­
panic Center concluded that the number of undocumented immigrants in the 
United States labor force reached eight million in 2010 (Passel 8c Cohn, 2011, 
p. 17). Some analysts believe that this is a very conservative estimate and that 
the undocumented workforce is actually much larger (Feltman, 2008, p. 80). 
Undocumented workers are concentrated in low-wage jobs. Indeed, the per­
centage of undocumented workers is highest in the farming (25%), building, 
grounds-keeping and maintenance (19%), construction (17%) and food prepa­
ration and serving (12%) occupations (Passel 8c Cohn, 2009, p. 15). Some an­
alysts estimate that undocumented workers constitute more than a quarter of 
the meatpacking and chicken processing industries in the United States (Or­
donez, Hall, 8c Alexander, 2010).
Undocumented workers merit special attention when examining crimmi- 
gration’s effects on labor standards enforcement, not only because of their sig­
nificant presence in low-wage industries. When compared to low-wage 
documented workers, undocumented workers experience violations of their 
labor standards protections at higher rates (Bernhardt et ah, 2009). Some of 
the most widely-publicized and extreme forms of workplace law violations in­
volving low-wage immigrant workers have come from the meatpacking and 
chicken processing industries. An immigration raid at Agriprocessor’s Iowa 
meatpacking plant in May 2008, for example, exposed major violations of 
workplace protections. Among other things, the search warrant alleged ex­
tensive injuries, child labor violations, sexual harassment, employment dis­
crimination and failure to pay proper wages (Preston, 2008). These working 
conditions are consistent with an earlier and widely-publicized Human Rights 
Watch report about working conditions in the meatpacking industry. The re­
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port characterized jobs in the meatpacking industry as the “most dangerous 
factory jobs in the country” (as cited in Compa & Fellner, 2005), Injuries in meat­
packing plants, according to the report, commonly include “cuts, amputa­
tions, skin disease, permanent arm and shoulder damage, and even death from 
the force of repeated hard cutting motions” (Compa, 2004, p. 29).
What Is Crimmigration in the Labor Context?
Many aspects of crimmigration have been aptly characterized by the other 
authors of this volume. Nonetheless, very few scholars and analysts have fo­
cused on the labor-related aspects of crimmigration. This chapter first de­
scribes several characteristics of the crimmigration phenomena that are unique 
to the labor context. In Part II, it then elaborates the underappreciated con­
sequences of these aspects of crimmigration on undocumented workers’ wage, 
health and safety, employment discrimination and collective activity protections 
(labor standards enforcement).
Both the federal government and subfederal governments (states, cities and 
other types of local governments) have brought crimmigration enforcement 
directly into the workplace in a number of ways. As a result, the nature of im­
migration enforcement in the workplace has increasingly included norms, pro­
cedures, enforcement tactics and sanctions from the criminal law context. In 
1986, the federal government introduced crimmigration into the labor con­
text for the first time. That year, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, commonly referred to by its initials, “IRCA” (1986). 
This long-debated federal legislation represented the first time that the federal 
government explicitly aimed to regulate immigration flows via the workplace, 
rather than solely at the borderlands and through other types of interior en­
forcement measures.
While IRCA’s sanctions primarily targeted employers’ behavior, this federal 
immigration law created new criminal sanctions for both employees and em­
ployers. The U.S. Congress did not make the act of working without immi­
gration authorization an illegal act. Instead, through an amendment, it instituted 
criminal penalties for employees who knowingly use fraudulent documents to 
gain employment (IRCA, 1986, § 1324c(a); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. 
v. N.L.R.B., 2002, p. 149). Thus, employees who provide false identification 
documents to their employers are subject to sanctions. These penalties add to 
the myriad other ways that criminal law intertwines with immigration en­
forcement measures against undocumented immigrant workers.
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IRCA’s verification requirements and sanctions, however, illustrate that em­
ployers are the primary focus of IRCA’s enforcement measures. Before IRCA, 
employers did not have to check whether their employees had proper immi­
gration authorization to work in the United States. Because of IRCA, em­
ployers must verify that each employee has proper immigration authorization 
to work through the use of an 1-9 form or an electronic verification system (E- 
Verify). Employers also face potential civil and criminal sanctions for know­
ingly hiring an undocumented worker. Specifically, IRCA provides criminal 
sanctions for employers who have a pattern or practice of knowingly employ­
ing undocumented workers (§ 1324a(f), 1986). Employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers can be fined up to $3,000 for each undocumented 
worker and/or face imprisonment for up to six months (IRCA, § 1324a(f)(l), 
1986). Along with these criminal penalties, employers can be charged with 
other kinds of crimes “such as document fraud or harboring unauthorized 
aliens, and [can be] subject to the relevant penalties for those violations” 
(Bruno, 2012, p. 5).
The federal government is not alone in its efforts to bring crimmigration 
enforcement into the workplace. Subfederal governments have also brought 
crimmigration into the labor context in recent years through a variety of im­
migration regulatory measures and workplace-based enforcement actions. The 
laws of a number of states, for example, contain criminal penalties for em­
ployers who employ undocumented immigrants. A few examples include Fla. 
Stat. Ann., §448.09, 2010, Va. Code Ann., §40.1-11.1, 2010, W. Va. Code 
Ann., §21-IB-5, 2010, Colo. Rec. Stat. Ann., §8-2-122(4), 2010, Idaho Code 
Ann., §44-1005, 2012 and Iowa Code Ann., §715A.2A 2010. In addition, some 
localities have entered into agreements with the federal government, often re­
ferred to as “287g agreements,” which allow local law enforcement officers to 
enforce some elements of immigration law (Vazquez, 2011, p. 658; Illegal Im­
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA], § 1357(g), 
1996).
For both the federal and subfederal governments, crimmigration enforce­
ment efforts in the workplace sometimes take the form of surprise raids of 
workplaces by law enforcement officers and civil or criminal arrests in the wake 
of those raids. After the large-scale immigration raid of Agriprocessor’s meat­
packing plant described above, several supervisors were arrested and almost 300 
undocumented immigrant workers were convicted of both immigration and 
criminal charges. The majority of these workers were sentenced to five months 
in prison. Many of them were then deported from the United States upon the 
completion of their incarceration (Preston, 2008).
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Immigration cases constitute a significant portion of the federal govern­
ment’s criminal prosecutions each year in the United States. In fact, just over 
thirty percent of all federal prosecutions involve immigration matters. This 
percentage is higher than the percentage for any other type of federal criminal 
prosecution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Immigration and Customs En­
forcement Agency (ICE) is now the most significant investigative branch of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Stumpf, 2008, p. 1589). As the 
chapter will elaborate upon in Part II, mounting crimmigration pressures on 
both employers and employees at the federal and subfederal levels threaten to 
affect labor standards enforcement in a number of ways. The potential conse­
quences of crimmigration in the labor context are all-too-often underappre­
ciated aspects of the crimmigration story.
What Are the Potential Consequences of 
Crimmigration in the Labor Context?
Crimmigration may affect labor standards enforcement because it alters the 
set of incentives of both employers and employees. Incentives and disincentives 
play an important role in the development and enforcement of laws in the 
United States. Indeed, laws largely intend to “regulate [] behavior by generat­
ing incentives” and thus do not rely exclusively on “the direct exertion of co­
ercive force” (Cox, 2008, p. 387). Crimmigration creates incentives for bad 
apple employers to discriminate against job applicants that “look foreign.” 
Crimmigration in the labor context also fosters employer incentives to reduce 
workers’ collective action efforts and potential complaints about wages, health 
and safety, and employment discrimination through immigration enforcement 
threats. Similarly, it establishes disincentives for employees to come forward to 
government authorities to complain about their employers’ violations of their 
workplace protections.
These incentives and disincentives are important to highlight because the fun­
damental rationale underlying workplace protections for wages, health and 
safety, anti-discrimination and collective activity is that the law should create 
disincentives for employers to fail to provide these protections and should cre­
ate incentives for employees to come forward when their protections have been 
violated. Rather than relying on government inspectors to police workplaces, 
U.S. labor and employment law largely relies on the power of employer disin­
centives and on the workers themselves to act as “private attorneys general”
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who come forward to notify government officials about potential violations 
of their rights (Griffith, 2011, pp. 431-36).
Crimmigration and Employer Discrimination
Crimmigration pressures from both the federal and subfederal levels may en­
courage risk-averse employers to steer away from Latino and other minority job 
applicants. This practice would violate employees’ civil rights protections. As 
long as potential employees have proper work authorization, both Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act and IRCA prohibit employers from favoring one national 
origin over another (Civil Rights Act, §2000e-2, 1964; IRCA, §1324b(a)(l), 1986). 
It is reasonable to conclude that if an employer faces potential criminal liabil­
ity for hiring an undocumented worker, he or she may be nervous about hir­
ing “foreign-sounding” or “foreign-looking” applicants who have proper work 
authorization. Instead of risking criminal liability, risk-averse employers may 
prefer to hire white, or “non-foreign-seeming,” workers. In this way, crimmi­
gration may unintentionally promote employment discrimination against 
Latino applicants and other minorities by creating problematic incentives to avoid 
hiring foreign employees.
The creation of additional burdens on employers in the immigration en­
forcement context encourages employment discrimination. When Congress 
enacted IRCA, it acknowledged that too many burdens on employers could 
lead to unwanted employment discrimination. As a result, it included a num­
ber of safeguards against employment discrimination based on national origin 
and citizenship status (IRCA, § 1324b(a)(l), 1986). It also created an Office 
of the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices 
to enforce IRCA’s employment discrimination protections. As I have argued 
elsewhere based on a review of IRCA’s legislative history, “Congress arguably 
kept burdens on employers minimal, at least in part, to reduce incentives for 
employers to discriminate.” Thus, the combined federal and subfederal crim­
migration activity “raises the stakes for employers,” creating additional incen­
tives to discriminate against employees based on race, national origin and 
citizenship status (Griffith, 2011, p. 423). These incentives are in tension with 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as IRCA’s protections against employ­
ment discrimination.
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Crimmigration and Employer Retaliation
Crimmigration may affect labor standards enforcement by emboldening 
some bad apple employers to use immigration threats to retaliate against un­
documented immigrant employees who are organizing collectively with their 
co-workers, or who may complain to government officials about violations of 
their workplace rights. The labor standards protections discussed here explic­
itly forbid employers from retaliating against employees who make complaints 
about potential violations of their wage, health and safety, anti-discrimination 
and collective activity protections (Civil Rights Act, §2000e-3(a), 1964; Fair Labor 
Standards Act [FLSA], §215(a)(3), 1938; Occupational Safety and Health Act 
[OSHA], §660(c), 1970; National Labor Relations Act [NLRA], § 158(a)(4), 1935). 
Employers who retaliate against their employees by actually calling federal or 
subfederal enforcement officers, or by threatening to call these officials, en­
danger these baseline workplace protections.
Workers faced with the potential consequence of not only deportation, but 
also criminal sanctions, are more disinclined to join their co-workers in col­
lective efforts to improve working conditions and to complain to government 
officials when their workplace rights are violated. As a federal appeals court 
judge put it, as compared to their documented counterparts, “undocumented 
workers confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible discharge, 
their employer will likely report them to the [immigration authorities] and 
they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution” 
(Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 2004, p. 1064). As a result, these workers are less likely 
to fulfill their crucial roles as private attorneys’ general in the labor standards 
enforcement scheme.
The recent crimmigration trend to involve subfederal law enforcement of­
ficers in immigration enforcement threatens to be particularly problematic. 
Professor Stephen Lee has recently uncovered the ways in which some em­
ployers may use local law enforcement officers to retaliate against their un­
documented immigrant employees. According to Lee, “crafty employers can report 
incompliant workers to local law enforcement officers” who then report the 
workers to federal immigration authorities. Thus, crimmigration enforcement 
by local officers further bolsters “the strong incentives employers have to report 
unauthorized workers at the first sign of labor-oriented activity” and has “begun 
to undermine the assertion of workplace-related rights” (2011 p. 1132).
Lee’s invocation of a recent example from Tennessee illustrates this new sub­
federal crimmigration dynamic well (2011, pp. 1132-36). A cheese factory 
hired a number of undocumented workers and subsequently failed to comply
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with wage laws to compensate these workers for their work. The workers en­
gaged in collective activity at their workplace to try to pressure their employer 
to pay them for the work they performed. In response, the employer called in 
subfederal criminal law officers and reported that the workers were undocu­
mented immigrants. The subfederal criminal law officers detained the work­
ers and contacted federal immigration authorities.
While there are numerous anecdotal reports and examples in the case law 
of this practice by some bad apple employers (Lee, 2009, p. 1120; Rivera v. 
NIBCO, Inc., 2004, p. 1064), there is very little empirical data on the frequency 
of employer retaliation in the crimmigration context. A three-city survey con­
ducted in 2009, however, illustrated that employers who retaliate in low-wage 
industries often retaliate by threatening to call immigration authorities when 
faced with collective activity in the workplace or potential workplace law com­
plaints (Bernhardt et ah, 2009, pp. 24-25). Moreover, according to the Human 
Rights Report about the meatpacking industry referenced above, employers 
too often take advantage of immigrants’ “vulnerabilities,” which include “lim­
ited English skills; uncertainty about their rights; alarm about their immigra­
tion status if they are undocumented workers” (as cited in Compa & Fellner, 
2005).
Crimmigration and the Culture of Fear
Crimmigration may not only affect labor standards enforcement by creat­
ing problematic incentives for employers to engage in employment discrimi­
nation, by encouraging new forms of employer retaliation, or by bringing 
subfederal law enforcement officers into the mix. Crimmigration may also af­
fect labor standard enforcement by further fostering a culture of fear in im­
migrant communities. In this way, crimmigration has a powerful symbolic 
effect even when it does not directly affect employers’ behavior or specific im­
migration enforcement initiatives in the workplace. As Hortensia said in the open­
ing paragraph, “because we’re illegal... [w]e’re afraid to” complain about our 
employer’s failure to pay us for the work that we completed. In her words, Al­
abama’s crimmigration law “gives him [the employer] the power” to fail to pay 
his undocumented immigrant workers if he so desires (Southern Poverty Law 
Center, 2012, pp. 11-12). Undocumented immigrants’ fear of coming forward 
and organizing collectively with fellow workers because of immigration con­
sequences is noted extensively by scholars and worker advocates (Griffith, 2012, 
pp. 633-35).
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Heightened fear among immigrants reduces their incentives to come for­
ward when they experience even the most severe abuses of their workplace 
protections. It also affects their incentives to engage in collective activity and 
the overall bargaining power of workers vis-a-vis their employers. These trends 
further weaken organized labor’s efforts in the workplace. Professor Hila 
Shamir’s proposal to bring labor norms into anti-trafficking law has recently 
highlighted, in a different context, that the criminalization of immigrant work­
ers increases fear among workers and weakens workers’ bargaining power. As 
a response, she proposed an innovative and inclusive approach to trafficking 
law which “focuses attention on elements of the legal order that shape work­
ers’ bargaining power, such as labor and employment laws, national immi­
gration regimes, criminal law, welfare law, and private law background rules” 
(2012, p. 94).
Discussion Questions
1. What are the specific ways that crimmigration law affects the labor con­
text?
2. Are you convinced of this chapter’s claim that crimmigration negatively af­
fects labor standards enforcement? Why or why not?
3. Current comprehensive immigration reform proposals do not explicitly 
address immigration law’s effects on the wages, working conditions and col­
lective activity protections of immigrant workers. Should they? Why or 
why not?
4 Assume for the purposes of this final question that you believe that com­
prehensive immigration reform proposals need to address the problems 
raised in this chapter; what explicit proposals should be added to new leg­
islation that could deal with the specific problems raised in this chapter?
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